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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of clarity and convenience. the parties
to this appeal will be referred to in this brief in the manner
outlined in the brief of the plaintiffs and appellants
DefendanJts substantially agree with the statement of
facts as set forth in plaintiffs' brief, ~cept that the assertions on page 6 of said brief to the effect rthat construction
mortgages on the lorts in question were obtained from d&
fendant mortgagees herein, and the said properties were
then subsequently conveyed by Zions Building and Construction Company to the respective defendant p~
herein subject to such mortgages, is incorrect. As a matter of :f.iact the construction mortgage money in each case
was obtained from the Anderson Lumber COmpany, Provo,
UrtJah, and after completion o.f the dwellings, sales were
negotiated with the respective defendant purchasers who
in tum negotiated 1ong term mortgage financing wilth the
respective defendant mortgagees herein, ~and the construction mortgage. to Anderson Lmnber Company was paid off
in eaCh case from the funds obtained from the long term
financing.
Defendants, of course, do not agree with the conclusion drawn by rthe plaintiff from said ~stattement of facts,
and they also feel that since the agreement between plaintiftis and Zions Building and Construction Company referred
to mplaintiffs'' brief and set forth in part therein, is a basis
for plaintiffs' ·claim, clarity will be served by setting forth
the same herein in full. Said agreement reads as follows,
t~wit:

''This agreement made this 13th day of November, 1954,
by and between Erastus Peterson and Cornelia S.
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Peterson, his wife, called itlhe parties of the first part,
and George B. Carter, and Elmer D. Loveiess, dba Zions'
Building and Construction Company, a co-partnership,
herem called the parties of th·e second part, all of Utah
Ootmty, State of Utah,
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the parties of the firsrt part are the owners
of certain reHl estate consisting of lorts situated in the
Peterson Tract Subdivision in ·O,rem City, .Uitah County, State of Utah, which said lolts they are ·ho~ding for,
in the main, residenti'al development, and
WHEREAS, the pwties of the second part are experienced irn the building and oonsrt:ruction of home
and ioommercial developmenlt, and,
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire 1Jo work together
on a home construction and sale program and have
reached an agreement with respect to the oonstruction
and sale of homes or buildings on said property,

N·OW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
promises of the respective parties 'herein contained and
set forth, irt is mutually agreed as ~ollows:

1. That the parties of the first part shall make available to the parties of the second part !>or the constru.ction of ~homes or business buildings, one such building
upon each such lot, 1Jhe following described real property situated in Orem City, Utah. County, State of
U1Jah:
Lots 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 in Block 2, Lots 2, 3, 4, 5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 in Block 3, !and Lots 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 in Block 4, all in Pet~ Tract
Subdivision of OTem City, Urtah County, State of U11Jah.
Lots 13 and 14 in Block 3, and Lot 28 in Block 1, all
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in Peterson Tract Subdivision of Orem Oity, Utah County, State of Utah.
Provided, however, that said Lots 13 and 14 in Block
3, and Lot 28, in Bl·ock 1, shall be used for commercial
development.
2. :Lt is further agreed and understood that said lots
as they are needed or desired for construction purposes
by the parties of the second part, within 1Jhe limits hexeinafter stated, shall be deeded to the parties of the
second part by ·the parties of .the first part; provided
that upon the execution and delivery of any such deed,
parties of the second part shall in respect to each such
deed, ex·ecute and deliver to parties orf the first part
a promissory note in rthe principal amount m $850.00
bearing interest at the rate of r6% peT annum from date
thereof with principal and interest to be payable upon
the sale of the house or other building.
It is agreed that when smd lots are so deeded by
the parties of the first part to .fue parties of the second part, the parties of the second part shall proceed
to construct ·homes or business buildings as the case
may be and shall with diligence carry said CO!llStructiorn to completion. It is further agreed that construction shall be begun on any particular lot within thirty
days aliter the deed thereto ·has been given by parties
orf the first part.
3.

It is agreed that upon completion of any home or
business building upon the lots herein mentioned, the
same shall be sold and upon the sale thereof the parties of the first part shall receive the first $850.00 plus
inrterest as above provided from tile sale of each such
lot unless such amormt has theretofore been paid in
respect to ·any such lort as above set forth, and it is fuT..
ther agreed that both Erastus Peterson and George
B. ·Carter s:hall participate in the sale of such homes
4.
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and lots and shall partieipate equally in any real estate
or fire insurance commissions paya:ble in connection
therewith, provided that any commission payable to
Erastus Peterson shall be in addition to the $850.00,
plus intereSJt payable for the lots as above provided.
It is agveed that all sales will be listed through the
Peterson Real Estate Cb,mpany owned and operated
by Erastus Petevson, pro~ded, however, that in the
event it appears advi~sable to both parties,, one 0[' more
of the houses or buildings may be listed f or sale through
the J. Edwin S:tein Co. or orther -companies mutually
agreed upon and in such event such ·houses will become available for sale tlwough the Multiple Listing
Bureau and S!hall be subject to the regulations thereof.
It i's a1so agreed that any homes or buildmgs sold by
George B. C·arter shall be soJd through the J. Edwin
Stein Co., or some other Ucensed broker with whom ~he
becomes associated.
1

1

5. It is further agreed and unders1Jood by and between
the pavties hereto, that upon the sale of homes 0[' business buildings, the cost of the lot in ·the amount of
$850.00, plus interest and rthe ·cost of construction, and
the cost of sale and all orther reasonable and necessary
expenses whieh are ordinary in building, shall be first
deducted room the sale price and from the balance, 0['
net profit so determined, one-third (1/3) thereof shall
forthwith 'be paid over 'by the parties of the second part
to Erastus Peterson and Cornelia S. Peterson, parties
of the first part, as their share o[ the profit.
1

6. It is agreed that time is the ess·ence of this conwact, and it is understood that ·parties of the second
part will pursue the construction herein contemplated
with diligence and in the event parties of the second
part do not commence -construction WO['k upon any
particular lot within thirty days after the F.H.A~, or
V.A., :commitment is received, and after receiving the
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deed thereto as above provided; ar in the event parties
of the second part shall fail to proceed wtifu ·construction upon rthe overall ~oject for any period of three
eonsecutive months, parties of the first part shall be
entitled to terminate this agreement and be relieved of
any fiuvther obligation to oonvey any lots then undeeded
by giving parties of the second part ten days written
notice of their intention so to do.
7. It is further understood and agreed that in the
·event any of the provisions of this agreement are broken o~ disregarded by either of tile parties hereundeT,
the parties guilty of ·any such breach ~Shall pay the
reascmab~e expenses incurred by the injured parties in
the enfio~cement of this agreement oc in the protection
of any rights conferred hereundeT including a reasonable attorneys fee.
Thls agreement shall be binding upon the parties
hereunder, their ·heirs, representatives or assigns.

8.

9. In the evenrt there is a loss which resulrts from the
construction work agreed ·herein, it is agreed that the
first parties shall not be required to pay any such loss,
burt that the second parties shall be liable therefor,
and shall be required to pay for the lots, and in addition thereto they shall be required to pay all construction and other charges incident to the building herein.
IN WITNESS WHEREO·F, the parties have hereunto
fi-xed their signatures the day and the year first albove

written.
PARTIES OF THE FIRS~ PART
js/ Erastus Peterson
js/ Cornelia S. Peterson
PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART
js/ George B. Carter
js/ Elm~ D. Loveless''
·cR-G7, R-F7, R-R7).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTO,PPEID BY THiE NATURE
QJF THEIR AGREE'MENT WITH ZION·.s BUILD'ING &
CONSTRUCTIOIN CO~MPANY AND BY THE GIVING OlF
A WARRANTY D·E'ED FROM EFFECTIVELY ASSERTING ANY CLAIM UNDER THE THEO·RY 0'F A VENDO·R'S LIEN 0'R 'OTHERWISE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT PURCHASERS AND DEFENDANT MO,RTGAGEES.
POINT II
THE TRIAL C01URT CO,RRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE DEFENDANT PURCHASERS AND [)EFENDANT MO~RTGAGEES WERE BO·NA FIDE PURCHJASE'RS FO·R VALUE.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR, AND THE
COURT DID NOT ERR IN O·RDERING JUDGMENT
AGAINST THEM.
POINT IV

SINCE DEFENDANT PURCHASERS AND MORTGAGEES WERE NOT A PARTY TO ANY AGREEl\1ENT
WRI'rl'EN OR OTHERWISE, W HE REB Y THEY
AGREED TO PAY INTEREST OR ATrO·RNE:YS' FEES,
THERE IS NO BASIS F·O·R SUCH A CLAIM BY PLAINTIFFS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1

PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED BY THE NATURE
OF THEIR AGREEMENT WITH ZIONS BUILDING &
CONSTRUCTIO~N COMPANY AND BY THE GIVING OF
A WARRANTY DE'ED FROM EFFECTIVELY ASSERTING ANY ~CLAIM UNDER THE THEO·RY OF A VENDOR'S LIEN OR OTHERWISE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT PURCHASERS AND DEFENDANT MORTGAGEES.
A reading of the plaintiffs' brief compels the conclusion that the plaintiffs base their claim upon rthe agreement
enrtered into between themselves and Zions Buildmg and
Cbnstruotion Company, which agreement is hereinabove
set forth in full. They contend that the recording of thi:s
agreement gives constructive notice to all the world and
partioularly to the defendants herein, of a lien in favor of
plaintiffs against the property in question. This lien, then,
if it exists, arises by reason of a oonwact rather than by
operation of law. Plaintiffs refer to this lien as a "Vendor's
Lien"., Defendants asse:vt that a lien created by !C:ontract
is not a vendor's lien. The term Vendor's Lien is defined
in Black's Law Dictionacy, at page 1804 as: "A lien for
purchase money remaining unpaid allowed in equity to the
vendor of land when the statement of receipt of the price
in tlhe deed is not in accordance with the fuct". It would
appear that any claim ~here ~based on said agreement would
be in the nature of a security arrangement for the promise
to pay f.or the purchase price of the lot in question. The
plainti~~s further eontend that this security arrangement
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survives the covenants and wa:r.ranties of the subsequent
warranty deed given by them to Zions Building and Construction Company. Defendants very strenuously assert
that if this is the theocy of plaintiffs' ·claim, they are vecy
definitely barred from asserting the rsame under the rule
of estoppel by deed inasm·uch as such claim is directly in
the teeth of the warranties and covenants of plaintiffs'
warranty deed and in direct deiTogation of such deed. The
principle of law is ·stated in 31 CJS art page 196 as follows:
"A person who assumes to convey an estate by deed
or his successor is estopped 'as against the grantee or
those in privity with him to assert anything in derrogatioo of the deed. A warrantor orf tiltle may not question ~the· validity of the title warranted nor may he

assert an outsrta:ndmg hostile

title~"

Under the theory apparently ad~anced in plainrtiffs'
brief the plaintiffs herein stand in ·the -claimed position of
grantors who hold a prior security interest in. tJhe nature
of a mortgage on the premises and as stated in the case of
Tripp vs. Langstone, 10 SE 2d 916, 218 No.- Car. 295, such
a grantor can assert no rights as mortgagee against his
grantee. In the oase of Curry vs. Southwall Corporation
(Okla.) , 138 P2d 528 (citing Nickel et al vs.. Janda 242 P.
264 Okla), the Court said:

"Deeds are solemn instruments, and it is right to suppose that what is stated in a deed represenrt:s the true
state of things; and equity, justice and good conscience
require no more than that a party to such instrument
should be precluded from contradicting it rto the prejudice of another person, when that orther, or a person
claiming through or under him has been induced to
alter his position on the faith o!f the instrument."
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''The rule is frequently started in broad language that a
grantor o[ land with full corvenam!1;s o[ warranty is estopped to claim any interest in the granted premises.''
Citing 19 Am. Jur. 606. Also see Body vs. McDonald
(Wyo.) 334 P. 2d 513, citing 31 C.J.S. Par. 10 and 13.

Howeve'r, defendants contend that a reading m said
agreement between plaintiffs and Zions Building and Construction Company will not show any expressed or implied
illltenrt to give plaintiffs a security interest in the property
to be conveyed pursuant to said agreement. If a security
arrangement is to be intended such intent must be manifest as distinguished from an intent to apply to the payment of the debt the proceeds from the sale off the property. Defendants submit that a reading of said agreement
discloses not only that there was no intenrt on the part o[
the parties to create a security arrnngement for the benefit of the plaintiffs, but neither was there any intent rto preserve a vendor's lien fior the benefit of plaintiffs. Rather
a reading of such document discloses that the sole purpose
and import of the aiTangement between the plaintiffs and
Zions Building and Construction Company was to vest title
to the real pvoperty under consideration in Zions Building
and ·Construction Company in order that financing foc construction purposes could be obtained and sales arranged
without any personal liability being assumed by the plaintiffis and that it was the intent of the parties to apply to
the payment of the debt for the purchase price of the lots
the proceeds from the sale of the property only.
Defendants feel that the law applicable to the cases at
hand is elearly srtated in 55 Am. Jur. beginning at page 874,
wherein it states as follows:
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"Where the conveyance is made for the pu·rpose of enabling the grantee to resell or to mortgage the land
and with the money so acqll.ir.ed to pay the purchase
money, this is held wholly inconsistent wirth any intention to retain an implied vendor's lien, and is therefore a waiver thereof, for had the vendor desi~gned to
retain the equitable lien it might have oontinued such
an encumbrance upon the land as would have defeated
the effo~1: to obtain the loan to be seeured by the mortgagee. The same has been held true wh~e the land
was sold for the express purpose of bemg eonveyed
free from encumbrances to a corpornrtion thereafter
to be formed by which the property was to be developed, and a part of the purchase money was to be in
shares of the company and the balance insofar as possible from the profits of the development.''
It is submitted that a fair interpretation of said agreement between plaintiffs and Zions Building and Oonsrtruction Company makes it manifest that the purpose o[ the arrangement between the plainttiffs and Zions Building and
COilSIWuction Company was to facilitate ~the development,
mortgaging and sale of lots under consideration, and that
there ·was a complete waiver ~by the plaintiffs of any vendor's lien or equitable mortgage whlch tlhey ,might ~have:
otherwise had had some other arrangement been entered
into.

Reference is. made to the case of Finlayson vs. Waller,
an Idaho case reported at 134 P. 2d, 1960, wherein it states
that where a vendor -conveys an apartment house to a purchaser to enable purchaser to mortgage the property to
acquire funds to pay vendor the compensation agreed upon,
the vendor's conduct was inconsistent with any intent to
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retain an implied vendor's lien, and such conduct constituted a waiver of any such lien.

The Utah case of McMurdie vs. Chugg, 99 Utah 403,
107 P. 2d, 163, cited by the plaintiffs in their brief is not at
all inconsistenrt witll the p~opositions above stated. In thart
case the suit was between the vendor and the vendee, and
was nort a suit between the vendor and purchasers from the
vendee as in the eases now before the Court. In the McMurdie ·case the Urta:h Supreme Oourt stated:
"I!t is a well established rule of law that a vendor does
nort waive his vendor's lien for the purchase price simply by taking the vendee's own personal note for the
!amount due. H the vendoc accepts the obligation of
a third party, or if he expressly oc impliedly waives his
lien irt may be extinguished, but the taking of a peTsonal unsecured pTomissory note of the ·buyer cannot
be held to be a waiver of the lien. In this case we find
no ·express or implied waiver of the vendor's lien, and
we 'hold that the acceptance of the unsecured personal
pvonnssory norte to the buyer ~cannot ·be construed to
constitute a waiver of said lien."
1

This cirted case is decidedly different from the cases
now befiore the Oourt, wherein the plaintiffs entered into
a transaction whereby they agreed to transfer their prop-

erty for the ·Obvious purpose of inducing others to extend
financing upon the premises and to purchase the same in
full rcliance upcm the warranty deed given by the plaintiffs in the respective oases.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT THE D,EFENDANT PURJCHASERS AND DE-
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FENDANT MORTGAGEES WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE.
Black's Law Dictionary at page 234 defines bona fide
purchaser as "A purchaser fior a valuable consideration
paid or parted with in the belief 1Jhat the vendor had a
right to sell and without any suspicious circumstances to
put him on inquiry. A bona fide purchaser is one who buys
property of another without notice that some third person
has a rightt to or il1J1:erest in such property and pays his
full and faiT price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he 'has noti~ce of the claim or interest of
some other in the property.'' There is no dispute that rtJhe
defendant pwchasers and defendant mortgagees paid value
ror the respective properties and extended loans upon the
same, but the pl,aintiffs contend that by reason of the recording o!f the agreement between plaintiftis and Zions
Building and ·Construction Company, these defendants were
put on notice that the plaintiffs had a claim against the
property paramount to any interest such defendants might
acquire. For the reasons hereinabove stated, namely that
if the plaintiffs seek to base their ·claims on a .contract theory, which interpretations defendants contend cannot in
any respect be reasonably read into said agreement, the
plaintiffs should be barred and estopped from asserting
any such claim by reason of the same bcing in derrogation
of the 'Narranty deed which they thereafter gave to Zions
Builidng and Construction Company, and secondly that
if the claim of pla:intiffs is to be raised by implication of
law on the theory of a vendor's lien, the agreement itself
and the subsequent conduct of the plaintiffs in oonveying
by warranty deed so completely negate any intention on
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the part off plaintiffis to retain a vendm-'s lien, that the defendants should not be deprived of their standing as bona
fide pwchasers for value by reason off their proceeding to
deal with the property whether their knowledge of the matter was actual, constructive, or through the agency of a
title insurance company.
POINT ill
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THEIR FAVOR, AND THE
COURT DID NOT ERR IN 0'RDERING JUDGMENT
AGAINS~ THEM.
For the reasons hereinabove stated, defendants assert
that .the plaintiffs were not in any respect entitled to a
favorable determination of ~their mortions for summaxy judgment in 1heir favor, and that the Court correctly determined
that the defendants, there being no genuine issue as to any
material faat, were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.
POINT IV
SIN~CE

DEFENDANT PURCHASERS AND MORTGAGEES WERE NOT A PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT
WRfl.IEN ~OR OTHE'RWISE, W HE REB Y THEY
AGREED TO PAY INTEREST OR ATI'ORNEYS' FEES,
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR SUCH A CLAIM BY PLAINTIFFS .
.A!.s is readily apparent from a reading of the agreement between plaintiffs and Zions Building and Construe-
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tioo Company, upon which agreement plaintiffs base their
claim, these defendants were not in any respect a party to
such agreement. The law is too well settled to admit of

dispute as to the fact 1Jhat attorneys' fees are not recoveTable, except pursuant to statutory authority or express written agreement providing therefor. No such statutory authority or agreement exists in the ·cases before the Court
as frar as these defendants are ooncerned. Zions Building
and Construction Company did execute ~and deliver to plaintiftls three promissory notes pro~ding fior attorne,ys' fees
and interest (R-G47, R-S42, R-R41). The rtrial ·oourt granted plaintiffs· judgment against the Zions Building and Construction Company and the individual partners thereof
including attorneys' fees ,interest and eosts (Supplemental
Transcript) but no appeal was taken by those defendants
and they are not befiore the Court at this time.
CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the trial Court did
not commit error in directing judgment against the plaintiffs, and consequently the judgment of the trial court in
these cases should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Cullen Y. Christenson
for CHRISTENSO'N, NOVAK, PAULSON
& TAYLOR

Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
Frederick Rulon Sargent, and Emily
Sargent, his wife; Robert M. Gillies
and Clarice K. Gillies, his wife; Foster
D. Rappeley and Avonell F. Rappeley,
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his wife; HOme Benefit Building Association; the Schenectedy Savings
Bank, and Walker Bank & Trust Company

55 East Center Street,
Provo, Utah
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